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Introduction
The resurgence of interest in the demand function for money stimulated by the development of cointegration techniques has generated a substantial literature on emerging as well as advanced economies. Thailand, as the first victim of the 1997 crisis, is a particularly intriguing example; but existing (English-language) studies raise more questions than they resolve.
After a brief review of this literature, new estimates of the Thai demand for all the standard measures of money are presented. All the results demonstrate that the demand for real money balances is a stable function of a scale variable and a coherent measure of opportunity cost, with all the properties predicted by economic theory.
Literature Survey
All previous work adopts the Cagan (1956) specification of the demand function as a maintained hypothesis, utilises quarterly data in estimation, defines real GDP as the scale variable, and agrees that the standard measure of opportunity cost, a domestic interest rate, is not appropriate for Thailand. As quarterly data on GDP are of recent origin, use of interpolation or a proxy is necessitated. Alternative scale variables have not been investigated.
The treatment of opportunity cost raises more substantial difficulties. Chowdhury (1997) asserts that regulations on interest rates and limited availability of alternative financial assets raise doubts about the appropriateness of standard interest rate measures; but he does not explain why controls on rates should ipso facto limit their appropriateness, or investigate his doubts empirically. He suggests F o r P e e r R e v i e w 2 instead that the inflation rate 'reflects the opportunity cost of holding money much more adequately than interest rates', but he does not actually use it in estimation. Bahmani-Oskooee and Rehman (2005) make a similar untested assertion, despite some success in using a money-market rate reported by Bahmani-Oskooee and Techaratanachai (2001) ; but they do at least include inflation in their estimating equation. Own-rates on time and savings deposits are nowhere mentioned.
References to external influences on money demand appear in all three papers. Chowdhury includes a Eurodollar interest rate 'to measure the degree of capital mobility'. All three include a nominal exchange rate in levels in a search for evidence of currency substitution, but do not spell out the expectational assumptions underlying their specification. In a bizarre interpretation of currency substitution Chowdhury concludes that An increase in the real [previously defined as nominal] exchange rate, i.e. depreciation of the Thai baht, would increase the demand for broad money. A depreciation raises the value of foreign securities held by domestic residents and lowers the value of domestic securities held by foreigners, as valued in their own currency. This, in turn, increases the demand for domestic money.
Bahmani-Oskooee and Rehman report the same sign for the exchange rate on M1 but the opposite for M2. Their suggestion of a wealth effect as the explanation for the former, in an economy committed to making large net interest payments denominated in dollars, strains credulity.
Suspending the disbelief induced by these idiosyncrasies, all three papers claim evidence of cointegration. Chowdhury's preferred specification yields two cointegrating vectors for both M1 and M2, but only one of each is reported. Bahmani-Oskooee and Rehman produce internally inconsistent results. The F-tests in their table 1 reject the null of non-cointegration for Thai M1 for some lagstructures, but not at all for M2. The t-ratio on the error-correction term in their table 8 is clearly F o r P e e r R e v i e w 3 insignificant for M1, perhaps because they include lags up to order 9 on the dynamic terms, most of which are also insignificant. The claimed significance of the error-correction term for M2 is based on an inappropriate standard critical value.
In the aftermath of the 1997 crisis more recent investigations have focused on short-run interactions between monetary and real variables, using very short samples for estimation which preclude consideration of long-run properties. For example, Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2002) In short, the existing literature sheds very little light on the demand for money in Thailand.
Data and Methodology
The long-run demand function is provisionally assumed to be of the Cagan form, in which the log of the real stock of money demanded is determined by the log of a real scale variable and a measure of opportunity cost (entered as a proportion). The assumption of zero-degree homogeneity in prices is subsequently tested, and alternative measures of the scale variable and of opportunity cost are examined. The long-run function is estimated within an unrestricted error-correction model which incorporates short-run dynamics. The null hypothesis of non-cointegration is tested by deletion of the 'level' variables, using non-standard critical F-values (Pesaran et al, 2001) . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The serial correlation test included in the standard diagnostics reported for the estimates is for firstorder; in all cases tests for up to third-order were conducted but revealed nothing to cause concern.
All the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ plots for the reported equations were satisfactory. Predictive failure was tested with a break at end-1993; shifting the break to end-1996 to isolate the post-crisis period made no difference to the results.
A Digression on Measurement
The interest semi-elasticity (F) of the Cagan demand function plays a crucial role in the monetary model of exchange-rate determination, which expresses the spot exchange rate as a function of current and expected future fundamentals and the expected exchange rate at the horizon, with a per- period discount factor of F/(1+F). The student who struggles successfully through the hoops of purchasing power parity, uncovered interest parity, rational expectations and the associated algebraic manipulations to arrive at this result may be forgiven for questioning the purpose of the exercise on being informed by (for instance) Hallwood and MacDonald (2000) that F I 0.02, on the authority of Bilson (1978a) ; if so, the coefficient on expected future fundamentals asymptotes to zero so rapidly that they might as well be ignored. On the other hand Engel and West (2005) attribute an estimate of F I 60 to the same author in a different paper (Bilson, 1978b) in support of their contention that the quarterly discount factor is around 0.98, in which case expected fundamentals in the distant future matter a great deal. Is this an illustration of the rhetoric of economics?
The substantive issue here concerns the measurement of interest rates. Engel and West assert (p497) without discussion that Bilson's (1978b, p61) own summary of the key result sheds light on the first two questions:
The interest rate elasticity, which is equal to the product of the regression coefficient [-1.3853 ] and the interest rate, would be equal to -0.15 [presented as a stylised fact] if the rate of interest were 10.83 per cent.
[Italics supplied].
Engel and West are clearly guilty of careless misreading in confusing elasticity and semi-elasticity; and Bilson's calculation demonstrates that interest is here entered as a proportion per annum. Bilson's (1978a) estimate of F = 0.15, rather than 60; but the number they adopt is actually 0.015. They may take some consolation from the fact that other contributors to this arcane literature have also displayed carelessness: Bilson (1978a, p85) In a context where precise numbers are crucial, experienced professionals might reasonably have been expected to exercise the degree of care customarily required of undergraduate students.
The remaining question is substantive. Expressing interest at quarterly rates in a quarterly model seems intuitively plausible, but the larger issue of measurement units is less easily resolved. In a static model it appears that the investigator is completely free to choose between proportions and percentages, or for that matter basis points, with dramatically different implications for the value of the interest semi-elasticity and for the properties of the monetary model. The unrestricted errorcorrection model provides an answer. With the dependent variable expressed as a proportionate rate of change, the conformable measure of the interest rate is as a proportion. Engel and West got the numbers wrong and in consequence overstated their case that the discount factor is almost one, but they selected the appropriate unit of measurement. 
Demand for Cash
Cash in the hands of the public plays a major role in the Thai monetary system, accounting on average over the sample for 70% of M1 and 11% of M2. Attempts to model the determinants of demand for cash produced results similar to those reported by Reilly and Sumner (2005) for Sri Lanka. The only interest rate available for the full sample is the central bank's discount rate, of rather limited direct relevance to the personal sector but a highly visible influence on other rates.
With either this or the inflation rate (DLP, defined on the GDP deflator) to represent the cost of holding cash, the diagnostics were unsatisfactory and the CUSUM test failed; in addition, with the former measure the null of non-cointegration was not rejected. Including both together did not improve matters; but a coherent measure of opportunity cost as the highest available rate of return on alternative assets, defined as OPC RD = MAX (RD, DLP) produced the more promising results detailed in equation 1 of table 2. Table 2 about here The fit is appreciably better than with either of the standard cost measures; all the dynamic terms (indicated by prefix D) are well-determined; apart from a marginal problem with the functional form all the diagnostics are satisfactory; and the F-test in the last row is consistent with a stable long-run relationship among the level variables. In contrast to Sri Lanka there were only four years (1955, 1957 and 1973-74) with a p-value for the hypothesis of equal coefficients of 0.67. The same property did not hold, however, for the first-differences of the opportunity cost components; instead these dynamic terms enter as separate continuous variables. Entering OPC in logs or the firstdifference of the level rather than log of the interest rate caused a deterioration in the fit, as in the UK (Chadha et al, 1998) and Sri Lanka. 
Demand Deposits
Modelling the determinants of demand deposits proved much simpler. The main differences are that inflation makes no contribution to the measurement of opportunity cost, and consumers' expenditure is clearly inferior to GDP as the scale variable. Both findings are consistent with the predominant use of demand deposits for business purposes rather than personal expenditure. No role was found for dynamics. No millennial problem emerged, so estimation is over the full sample period; the error in 1999 is (unsurprisingly) negative, but small. The results are summarised in table 3. In all cases the null of non-cointegration is firmly rejected by the F-test which, in the absence of dynamics, coincides with the F-value for the regression. The deposit rate produces a marginally better fit than the central bank discount rate, but it also raises 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The obvious conclusions to draw from this methodological digression are that the Johansen procedure is extremely sensitive and both the alternative procedures entail a serious risk of bias. The comparisons cannot establish that the equivocal results of both these methods are 'wrong' and the unambiguously positive ones from the unrestricted error-correction model are 'right', but they do demonstrate that the latter has substantially greater explanatory power.
Interest-Bearing Deposits
The question of primary interest in relation to time and savings deposits (SAV) is their relative responsiveness to opportunity cost and their own-rate of return. Equation 9 in table 4 shows that the magnitudes of response, in both levels and (log-) differences, are very similar. The hypothesis of coefficients which sum to zero cannot be rejected for levels (p=0.33), differences (p=0.17) or both (p=0.29), and these parameters all appear to 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
Conclusions
Economic theory is alive and well in Thailand. The demand for money in all its forms is a stable function of a few key variables. There is no evidence of money illusion. Agents adjust their (personal) money holdings in line with inflation when, but only when, real interest rates are negative. The differential between opportunity cost and the own-rate of Models estimated on annual data clearly cannot shed light on currency substitution or other extremely short-term influences, but it is doubtful whether quarterly models (even if appropriately specified) would be much more informative. Until the 1997 crisis, the Thai baht had moved closely with the US dollar except during the latter's appreciation in the early 1980s, even after a currency basket was substituted for the formal dollar peg, and anticipations of the crisis developed at a very late stage. Burnside et al (2001) observe that forward premia did not begin to rise significantly until mid-May, only 6 weeks before the initial devaluation. There was a conspicuous jump of 47% in foreign currency deposits with Thai commercial banks and Thai branches of foreign banks in
April, but this increased the stock to only 0.6% of total deposits; and half of this increase was eliminated by end-June. Any currency substitution did not show up in end-year data:
the M2 residual from equation 12 was positive and 30% larger than the standard error of the regression in 1997; the increase in time deposits dwarfed the rise in foreign currency deposits.
What models using long runs of annual data can do is to determine whether a stable lowfrequency relationship exists among the variables of interest, and to estimate its parameters with more confidence than would be possible with more but higher-frequency observations over a shorter period. Augmentation as needed to ensure white-noise residuals.
The variants of OPC (described in the text) all have similar ADF values to that tabulated.
Approximate (because the series differ in length) critical value (at 5% level) for first 6 entries in column 1, which include a deterministic trend, is -3.6, and -3.0 for the remainder and for column 2. LEVEL denoted the stock whose first difference is the dependent variable.
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